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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Effect of Information and Decision-making on DoD Performance 
Incentives and Award Fees 
Presenter: Greg Hildebrandt worked in the areas of procurement, military operations research and 
defense intelligence during his Air Force career.  As an Air Force officer, he was also a Tenured 
Associate Professor of Economics at the Air Force Academy.  One of his specializations in Air Force 
procurement was in the use of multiple-incentive contracts.  He has been a Senior Economist at the 
RAND Corporation, focusing on Soviet-Military Economics and Cost Analysis, and an economics 
professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.  He is a graduate of the Air Force Academy and holds an 
MS in Operations Research from USC and a PhD in Economics from Princeton.   
Gregory G. Hildebrandt 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road 





This analysis discuses DoD policy for the use of Performance Incentives and Award-fee 
Contracts during System Development and Demonstration (SDD).  Both a review of the use of 
Performance Incentive Contracts since the 1960s, as well as the current policy required by the 
DoD to develop performance incentives are provided.  A performance incentive should be 
structured such that the contractor receives a profit for improved performance equal to the value 
to the government of the improved performance times the cost-sharing ratio.  This formula will 
motivate a contractor to spend no more than the government’s value to enhance performance.  
If exactly that amount is spent, the loss in profit resulting from increased cost will just equal the 
profit received from enhanced performance.  This project also shows how a similar logic can be 
extended to Award-fee Contracts.  The analysis examines alternative decision-making and 
informational structures to determine the effect on contract outcome when the performance 
incentives are structured in accordance with policy.  In certain situations, more complex 
incentive structures may be required.  However, the informational requirements to properly 
develop these more complex Incentive Contracts may be substantial. 
Introduction 
Recently, the General Accounting Office issued a report in which questions were raised 
about the role of profits in motivating defense contractors (2005). In fact, a RAND 1968 study 
was cited as evidence for this claim (Fisher, 1968).  The GAO report emphasizes that Award 
Fee pools on a particular contract are “rolled-over” from one evaluation period to the next, which 
provides the contractor with additional opportunities to obtain higher awards.  Typically, 
concludes the GAO, the final Award Fees that are received tend to be toward the high end of 
the possible range. 
In light of this report, it is appropriate to review the history of incentive contracting to 
include both the use of objectively measurable performance characteristics and Award-fee 
Contracts.  We focus on the use of these contractual arrangements when costs are shared 
between the government and the contractor. 
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This area has not escaped the notice of the academic community, and recently, a 
number of economists have suggested that the efficiency of the defense procurement process 
could be enhanced by employing new developments from the economics of information. While 
these recommendations have not yet been embraced by the procurement policy community, 
they do represent another area in which economic analysis may contribute to the efficiency of 
the defense sector.  The areas of particular interest to economists include incentive contracting, 
profit policy, source selection, and negotiation (for example, see Leitzel and Tirole (1993) and 
Bower and Dertouzos (1994)). 
Incentive contracting has probably attracted the greatest attention. Incentive contracts 
are primarily employed for the development and production of weapons systems. In the situation 
in which there are only cost incentives in the contract, the defense contractor shares some 
proportion of the contract costs with the government. Contracts, however, may also include 
performance incentives in which the profit received by the contractor varies with the 
performance level of the equipment being developed or procured.   
We begin with a brief discussion of the history of performance incentives from the 
standpoint of usage and policy, and relate these to the new developments in economic analysis.  
Then, we discuss the approach recommended by policy directives since the 1960s. Given this 
policy prescription, we show how predicted contract outcomes depend on the model used to 
describe contractor behavior. 
We then turn to Award-fee Contracts and combine performance incentives with an 
Award Fee.  Award-fee contracts are based on the subjective evaluation of the difficult-to-
measure characteristic of contractor performance.  
Performance Incentives in DoD Contracting and Economics 
The government contracted for its first aircraft with the Wright Brothers in July 1909 at a 
target price of $25,000 and a target aircraft speed of 40 miles per hour. However, for every mile 
per hour over the target, the contractor would receive an additional $2,500; and for every mile 
per hour under the target, the contractor would lose $2,500. The minimum required speed under 
the contract was 36 miles per hour. The speed achieved by the aircraft was 42 miles per hour; 
therefore, a performance incentive award of $5,000 was received in addition to the target price 
of $25,000 (Cook et al., 1967, August, p. 1).  
Interest in performance incentives, however, greatly increased during the 1960s.  The 
DoD Incentive Contracting Guide in 1962 stated:  
Perhaps no other DOD procurement policy offers greater potential rewards than the 
expanded use of performance incentives in developmental contracts. Properly 
conceived and applied, these incentives can do more than any other factor to 
encourage maximum technological progress under a single contractual effort. (p. 30; 
Sherer, 1964, p. 172)  
As a result of this guidance, contracts including performance incentives were widely 
used by the DoD during the 1960s and 1970s. Interestingly, procurement policy for performance 
incentives developed by the Department of Defense and NASA in the 1960s (and still in effect 
today) is based on the assumption of hidden knowledge possessed by the single contractor, not 
the government.  
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This example of adverse selection occurs because the contractor knows the non-
stochastic relationship between performance, q, and contract cost at the time that trade-offs are 
made, say, between cost and reliability, but the government does not.  In this situation, the 
reward received for enhanced performance, ∆q, should equal the contractor's share of contract 
costs, s, times the value to the government of the enhanced performance.  
There is a simple logic behind this performance reward. During the development 
process, the maximum the government is willing to let the contractor spend for enhanced 
performance is the value to the government of the extra performance. The government, 
therefore, is indifferent between such an expenditure and the extra performance achieved.    
Similarly, under this performance-incentive function, if the cost of enhanced performance 
is less than the value of that performance to the government, the contractor's profit would rise; if 
the cost is greater than its value to the government, the contractor's profit would fall. The 
contractor, therefore, is motivated to make the trade-off decisions that are in the interests of the 
government, even though the government does not know the cost to the contractor of the 
performance enhancement.  This approach was taught in DoD-sponsored procurement courses 
as early as 1964.1  
In October 1969, the DoD/NASA Incentive Contracting Guide explained that the above 
method achieves two important objectives, “first, it communicates the Government's objectives 
to the contractor; second, of greater significance, it establishes the contractor's profit in 
direct relationship to the value of combined performance in all areas” (p. 107, emphasis in 
original).  
As the DoD/NASA Incentive Contracting Guide has never been superseded, this policy 
remains in effect today. 
During the 1970s, attention shifted to the determination of the optimal risk-sharing 
relationship between the contractor and the government. It has been established that when the 
performance-incentive function is determined in accordance with policy, and when the 
government doesn't know the cost relationship, the contractor's share of contract costs, s, is the 
parameter that determines the optimal risk-sharing relationship between the contractor and the 
government.2   
However, the early discussions of optimal risk sharing focused on a situation in which 
there was only hidden knowledge, which has also been called subjective uncertainty.  In such 
situations, the contractor is assumed to maximize accounting profit on the contract.   The above 
analysis of risk sharing using the cost-sharing ratio during was also extended to the case of 
objective uncertainty, which occurs when there remains contractor uncertainty at the time the 
performance level is selected. In this situation, the contractor is assumed to maximize the 
expected utility of accounting profit.  This is a different level of uncertainty than that implicit in 
the policy implications of the DoD/NASA Incentive Contracting Guide. Objective uncertainty 
occurs when the there is cost uncertainty for the contractor (as well as the government) at the 
time the trade-off decisions are made. 
                                                
1 Case materials using this technique were developed by Harbridge House, Inc., in 1964. 
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The risk-sharing approach, however, raises an interesting issue. If, as many believe, the 
government is risk neutral while the contractor is risk averse, then under the assumptions of this 
analysis, it is optimal for the government to bear all the risk.  The optimal sharing ratio, s, 
therefore, equals zero. 
In the late 1970s and during the 1980s, economists addressed this issue by explicitly 
introducing the contractor’s unobservable effort level into the objective function of the contractor.  
If the government is the principal, and the contractor is the agent, then the agent’s economic 
profit is assumed to equal contractual profit less the implicit cost of effort.  Typically, the 
contractor is assumed to be either risk neutral or risk averse, and maximizes expected 
economic profit in the former situation and expected utility in the latter.3 
In addition, the contractor's effort was assumed to represent a hidden action that is not 
observed by the government, so that moral hazard is present. To address this problem, 
however, it is necessary for the government to know how this unobservable hidden action 
affects the contractor’s economic profit.  There are numerous other informational requirements, 
which, in total, may prevent this approach from becoming operational. 
In fact, while there were extended discussions of the role factors such as effort and 
extra-contractual considerations play in such contractual relationships, during the late 1960s, 
the only method of addressing this informational issue was through the use of award-fee 
contracts. In award-fee contracts, the contractor receives fees that are, in part, based on a 
subjective assessment of “development efficiency.”  The term development efficiency 
represents the many factors that provide an incentive to the contractor not to maximize 
accounting profit.  The term most frequently used is “effort,” for which there is an implicit cost to 
the contractor that is not part of accounting profit, but which affects the contractor’s decision-
making, and therefore, must be taken into account by the government.  These award-fee 
contracts have remained popular with NASA from the 1960s to the present and recently have 
been used extensively by the Department of Defense. 
DoD Policy Prescription 
We now turn to a discussion  of the method of structuring an incentive contract with the 
performance incentives advocated by the DoD.  To formalize the DoD prescription, let B(q-qT) 
equal the value to the government of the performance level developed relative to some target 
performance level, qT; and let C((q-qT),θ) equal the cost of performance to the contractor, where 
θ is an exogenous variable known to the contractor, but not the government, at the time q is 
selected. The variable θ, therefore, represents the hidden information dimension of the problem.  
The objective of the government is to maximize, by choice of q, net social benefits:  
(1) Maximize B (q-qT) - C ((q-qT),θ) 
The first order condition for this problem is: 
                                                
3 One of the clearest summaries of the modern approach to incentive contracts is contained in Kreps 
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(2) Bq = Cq, 
where the subscript equals the variable with respect to the partial derivative of the 
function.  
Let πA equal the total accounting profit received by the contractor. This total equals 
target profit, πT, plus the performance incentive function, P (q-qT), less the share of costs borne 
by the contractor, s (C-CT), where CT equals target cost. 
If the government sets P (q-qT) equal to sB (q-qT) as specified by procurement policy, 
then the contractor solves, by choice of q:  
(3) Maximize π A = πT + sB(q-qT) -  s[C((q-qT), θ) - CT] 
Equation (2), the first order condition desired by the government, is satisfied when the 
contractor solves this problem; as a result, the objectives of the government and the contractor 
are both satisfied. It is quite interesting that in this profit-maximization formulation, the optimal q 
selected by the government does not depend on s, πT, or CT. 
An important purpose of this analysis, however, is to consider objective functions that 
are more general than Equation (3), in order to determine the qualitative nature of the 
dependence of q on s, and πT under the assumption that the performance incentive function, 
P(q-qT), is structured in accordance with policy. 
First, we consider a situation in which unobserved contractor effort affects the 
contractor's economic profit.  Next, we generalize Problem (3),  augmented to include the 
implicit cost-of-effort function, to allow for contractor uncertainty at the time q is selected. For 
this situation, the contractor maximizes the expected utility of economic profit, and we consider 
both situations in which unobserved effort alternatively affects and does not affect expected 
utility.   Finally, we give recognition to the fact that the government’s program office has a 
significant amount of information about contractor effect.  This information, which may only be 
available during or at the completion of a contract is used to structure a contract which 
combines performance incentives, cost sharing and an award fee.  These contracts have been 
called Cost-plus-incentive-fee/Award-fee (CPIF/AF) contracts with multiple incentives.     
Contractor Accounting, Cost Certainty and Implicit Cost of Effort 
Following the economics of information revolution, economists now routinely assume 
that a contractor (agent) knows more about its own conditions of production and level of effort 
than does the government (principal). 
While the asymmetric information assumption probably does not hold true nearly as 
widely as economists would have one believe, it does have great deal of merit when it comes to 
the myriad trade-off decisions that must be made during weapons system development. Cost-
performance trade-offs must be made by design engineers on a day-to-day basis, and 
government contract administrators—even those who work at the contractor's facility—are 
unlikely to be familiar with these detailed trade-off opportunities that materialize during the 
contract.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that there is hidden information associated 
with the contract that is known to the contractor, but not the government.  The contractor knows 
more about the nature of effort and the effect of effort on implicit cost than the government. 
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With respect to the effort level of contractors, however, the asymmetric information 
assumption may be false. The contract administrators and members of the program office staff 
may know as much, if not more, about the effort of contractors than members of the company's 
leadership.  Awarding fees based on a subjective evaluation of the contractor's effort level is 
permitted in the policy directives, and we return to this issue below.  
It is, however, true that is difficult for the government to both quantitatively measure 
effort and properly specify the relationship between effort and economic profit at the time the 
contract is awarded. Therefore, we first explore the implications of the assumption that 
economic profit depends on unobserved effort. 
In the previous section, the variable θ represented exogenous factors affecting cost that 
are unknown to the government but are known to the contractor. In this section, we add the 
contractor's effort level, e, which generates an implicit cost to the contractor.  This variable, like 
θ, is not observed by the government. Unlike θ, however, e is chosen by the contractor. The 
implicit cost of effort is represented by the function h(e), where he > 0.  The implicit cost of effort, 
h(e) is subtracted from the accounting profit identified in Problem (3) to yield economic profit, π. 
The effort level also affects the observable contract cost, so the cost function is now 
expressed as C(q-qT, θ, e). We assume that Ce < 0, so that increased effort reduces contractor's 
cost; and Cqe. < 0, so that the marginal cost of performance decreases with increased effort.   
The problem faced by the contractor is now to choose q and e to so as to solve the 
following problem: 
(4) Maximize π = πT + sB (q-qT) - s[C(q-qT), θ,e) - CT]- h(e). 
The first order conditions for this problem are: 
(5) Bq = Cq, and 
(6) sCe = he. 
While Equation (5) is the government's desired first-order condition with respect to q, the 
effort level selected would not be that desired by the government.   
On the other hand, because h(e) is a social cost, this term should be subtracted from 
Problem (1), and the government's objective is for the contractor to select effort so that Ce = he: 
the marginal cost of increasing effort should equal the marginal implicit cost of effort. Because 
Ce < 0, this effectively states that the marginal benefits of effort should be equated to marginal 
implicit cost.  
This suggests that when effort affects the contracts economic profit, it is no longer 
appropriate for decision-makers to structure the incentive in the manner stipulated simply by:  
P(q-qT) = sB(q-qT). It is important, therefore, to be able to test whether contractor decision-
making is affected by the disutility of effort.  
It is clear from Equations (5) and (6) that the optimal q does not does not depend on πT 
or CT. However, the sharing rate, s, enters Equation (6), so we must determine how the optimal 
performance level q* depends on s. Setting the total derivatives of Equations (5) and (6) with 
respect to q*, e*, and s equal to zero, and solving for dq*/ds and de*/ds yields: 
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Because of the second-order conditions, the bordered Hessian, |H| is greater than zero 
under our assumption that Cqe < 0and Ce. <  0,  dq* /ds > 0, as indicated by Equation (7).  We 
can also derive the fact that de*/ds > 0 because the second-order conditions require that  
Bqq - Cqq < 0. 
Therefore, when the performance-incentive function is specified in accordance with 
policy (and the unobserved effort results in contractor disutility), optimal performance, from the 
standpoint of the contractor, increases with the sharing rate. It may be suggestive to say that 
higher cost sharing by the contractor induces greater effort, which reduces the marginal cost of 
performance. Given the specified marginal benefit function, the performance level selected 
increases.  
Contractor Accounting Cost Uncertainty and Implicit Cost of 
Effort  
We turn now to an analysis of contractor decision-making under uncertainty. At the time 
the contractor picks q and e, a random variable y determines the level of cost that actually 
occurs. In other words, the contractor can select a performance and effort level with certainty, 
but the resources that must be applied to achieve the q selected with effort level e are uncertain.  
The contractor's cost function becomes C(q-qT,θ,e,y), where the random variable y has a 
known distribution. We assume Cy >  0 and Cqy > 0, so both total cost and the marginal cost of 
performance increase with the value of y that emerges, when the other arguments of the 
function are held constant. 
It might be helpful to restate the meaning of “θ,” “e,” and “y.”  The variable, θ,  represents 
exogenous factors that are known to the contractor but not the government (hidden information 
or subjective uncertainty); the variable, e,  represents the effort level selected by the contractor 
but unobserved by the government (hidden action); and the variable, y, is a random variable 
representing the uncertain effect of q and e on contractor cost, given that “θ” is known to the 
contractor (objective uncertainty). 
Also, while economic profit, π, continues to be defined in the manner described above, 
the contractor now maximizes the expected utility of economic profits, EU(π), where U is a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The contractor, therefore, computes the expected value 
over the random variable y, and chooses q and e to solve:  
(9) Maximize W = EU{πT + sB (q-qT) -  s[C(q-qT), θ, y) -CT]– h(e))} 
For this problem, we obtain the following first-order conditions: 
(10) E{U' (.) [sBq - sCq] } = 0 
(11) E{U'(.)[-sCe- he]} = 0, 
 =
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where U'(.) equal the partial derivative of U with respect to π.  This partial derivative is 
evaluated at the optimal level of economic profit, π*.  It is important to appreciate that everything 
inside the brackets, {}, is inside the expectation operator. We also use ( ) to represent the 
arguments of a function, and [ ] to contain terms that multiply other terms inside the expectation 
operator. From Problem (9), we see that π* depends directly on s, πT, and CT, which are 
parameters to the contractor but variables determined by the government. 
Unfortunately, we have been unable to sign dq*/ds, or dq*/dπT, or dq*/dCT when the 
general Problem (9) applies. We can however, see from the objective function that  dq*/dCT = 
dq*/dπT.  A dollar of target profit and the contractor's share of target cost are perfect substitutes 
in the calculation of economic profit. To proceed further, we simplify Problem (9) by assuming 
that there is no implicit cost associated with effort—i.e., h(e) = 0. 
Contractor Cost Uncertainty without Implicit Cost of Effort 
The contractor's problem is to compute the expected value of utility over y and choose q 
to solve: 
(12) Maximize W =  EU{πT + sB (q-qT) -  s[C(q-qT), θ, y) - CT] )}, 
yielding the single first-order condition: 
(13) E(U'(.)[sBq -sCq] ) = 0. 
Equation (13) differs from Equation (10) because now economic profit does not depend 
on the effort of the contractor.  With a single first-order condition, we can use the rule for taking 
the derivative of an implicit function to calculate the comparative statics derivatives:  
(14a) dq*/ds = -Wqs/Wqq 
(14b) dq*/dCT = - WπT/Wqq 
(14c) dq*/dCT = -WqcT/Wqq, 
where the second-order condition ensures that Wqq < 0. 
Tackling Equation (14a) first, we obtain 
(15)  Wqs = E{U' (.) [Bq  - Cq] }+ E{U" (.) [Bq- Cq][B – C +CT]} 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (15) equals zero because of the first-
order condition. However, we are unable to sign the second term without making further 
assumptions. 
Turning to Equation (14b), we obtain 
(16)  WqπT = E{U" (.) [Bq - Cq] }. 
To sign WqsT, we use Pratt' s absolute measure of risk aversion, r, where 
(17) r(.) =  -U" (,)/U(,) 
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Substituting for U"(.), using Equation (17) we obtain 
(18)  WqπT = -E{r(.)U'(.) [Bq- Cq] }. 
If r is constant, then Equation (18) reduces to the first-order condition and WqπT = 0, 
implying that dq*/dπT = 0. 
Similarly, 
(19)  WqcT  = -sE{r(.)U'(•) [Bq - Cq] }. 
Under constant absolute risk aversion, dq*/dCT = sdq*/dπT.  Otherwise, the sign of  
dq*/dCT is indeterminate.  
Award Fees and Performance Incentives with Observable Effort 
Thus far, we have focused on the implications of employing government policy when the 
objective function of contractors is more complex than the basic policy assumes.  We have not 
presented the optimal incentive structures that might be employed in these situations.  The 
optimal incentive structure has only been provided for the model in which the contractor 
maximizes contract profit, and at the time cost versus performance trade-offs are made, the 
contractor has no uncertainty associated with the nature of these trade-offs.  The contractor is 
much better informed about these trade-offs than the members of the program office.  We will 
continue to employ this model, which will be augmented with an Award-fee Incentive.  Award-
fee Incentives are based on a subjective evaluation of some aspect of the contractor’s behavior 
that it is difficult to measure.  While we will continue to employ the term effort, the performance 
characteristic being evaluated should be viewed more broadly.  For example, it might be some 
characteristic of the efficiency with which engineering development is conducted. 
In this part of the analysis, we assume that contractors maximize economic profit, π, 
equal to accounting profit, πA, minus the implicit cost (or disutility) of effort, h(e).  Therefore, the 
contractor maximizes economic profit: π  =  πA - h(e). 
We now assume that government personnel in the program office and those who work in 
the contractor’s plant possess a great deal of information about the contractor’s effort and the 
disutility of this effort.  We assume, therefore, that the government has a firm understanding of 
the function, h(e), by the time the Award Fee is granted.  Furthermore, we view these implicit 
costs as social costs that the government must take into account.  
However, we continue to assume that there is an observation horizon below which the 
government does not have a great deal of information about the contractor’s behavior.  For 
example, we continue to assume that detailed trade-off information available to the contractor’s 
engineers is not known. 
In contrast to Equation (1), the government now selects q and the now-observable e to 
solve the following problem: 
(20) Maximize B(q-qT) - C((q-qT, e ),θ) – h(e). 
The government’s first-order conditions for the Award-fee Contract follow: 
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(21a) Bq = Cq 
(21b) -Ce =  he 
The contractor is given a performance incentive in the form P(q - qT), and the cost-
sharing ratio equals s.  In addition, the contractor is now given an Award Fee in the form A(e), 
where (as indicated) effort is  measurable by the government.  To maximize economic profit, the 
contractor selects q and e to solve the following problem: 
(22) Max   π = πT + P(q - qT) – s(C (q-qT, e ) - CT) + A(e) – h(e), 
and the following first-order conditions are obtained: 
(23a) Pq = sCq 
(23b) Ae – sCe = he 
With respect to q, the same condition of contractor cost certainty at the time of cost-
performance trade-offs that applies in the performance-incentive model continues to hold.  
Comparing Equations (21a) and (23a), we see that the performance incentive should be set so 
sBq = Pq.  Again, the extra reward for additional performance provided should equal the 
contractor’s share of the benefits to the government from the additional performance.  Then, the 
contractor will be motivated to spend no more than sBq for the associated incremental 
improvement in performance.  By spending this amount, the contractor will reduce economic 
profit by sCq, and both the government and the contractor will break even. If expenditure less 
than this can achieve the additional performance, both the government and the contractor are 
better off. 
If we compare Equations (21b) and (23b), we see that the following condition holds: 
(24) Ae = (1 – s)he 
The incremental award fee should equal the government’s share of the incremental cost 
of effort.  Equation (21b) shows that the contractor is compensated for the reduction in cost that 
results from additional effort.  Therefore, the remaining compensation required is shown in 
Equation (24).  One obtains the government’s desired result shown in Equation (21b).   
The achievement of this condition will not be affected by a change in the cost-sharing 
ratio.  As this ratio changes, Equation (24) indicates that the structure of the Award Fee will 
change correspondingly.    
Nor are any of the first-order conditions affected by πT or CT.  The objectives of the 
government and the contractor are both achieved. 
 
Comparative Statics Summary  
It is helpful to summarize the summary of our findings for the various models addressed.  
Models A through F assume that the contract is structured based on existing policy, and Model 
F addresses a model that is employs both performance incentives and Award Fees.  
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MODEL    CONTRACTOR CHARACTERISTICS  
    A          Cost certainty during trade-offs and no implicit effort cost 
    B          Cost certainty and unobservable effort cost 
    C          Cost uncertainty and unobservable effort cost 
    D          Cost uncertainty and no implicit effort cost 
    E          Cost uncertainty, constant absolute risk aversion, and no implicit effort cost 
    F          Cost certainty during trade-offs and observable effort and effort cost 
For these models, we examined the comparative static derivatives: dq*/ds, dq*/dπT, 
dq*/dCT.  The following table summarizes the findings: 
MODEL/SIGNS  dq*/ds  dq*/dπT  dq*/CT 
    A 0 0 0 
    B +  0 0 
    C ? ? ? (= sdq*/dπT) 
    D ? ? ? (= sdq*/ dπT) 
    E ? 0 0 
    F 0 0 0 
While many of the derivative signs remain ambiguous, several results are obtained. We 
turn now to the informational requirements associated with each of the models discussed.  
Conclusions 
This analysis has focused on the relationship between the DoD policy prescription in the 
use of performance incentives and the decision-making process of the government and 
contractor.  The policy rule discussed above—that states that a performance incentive fee 
should equal the contractor’s cost-sharing ratio times the value to the government of the 
enhanced performance—is applicable when cost uncertainty is eliminated at the time the 
contractor chooses the cost versus performance trade-offs and there is no implicit cost of effort 
(Model A).  If there is an implicit cost associated with effort, and this contractor behavior is 
observed by the government, then an Award Fee can be structured that meets the objectives of 
the government (Model F). 
Other informational situations may result in behavior that does not meet the 
government’s objectives.  While optimal incentive contracts can be constructed for these 
alternative situations (Models B through E), the information requirements may be quite 
demanding and the resulting incentive arrangements quite complex. 
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